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A PROPOSED PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR LOWER-COST HOUSING
IN THE UNITED STATES DERIVED FROM LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS OF
PRESENT HOUSING PRACTICE
by
James H. Davis*

INTRODUCTION
For the past decade there has been an intense effort to formu
late and implement housing practices and policies that would solve
our housing problems. In fact, one might describe the period of
the sixties as a frantic scramble to come up with one idea or com
bination of ideas that would prove to be the cure. Major studies,
sweeping legislation, dramatic goals came and went almost faster
than they could be tried, until now we are left with a complex and
chaotic housing policy that still cannot provide the quality and vari
ety in shelter that we need.
The problem is of our own making of course; we in housing
have misled ourselves. We have too often looked upon sub-standard
housing as if that were the norm. In fact, the housing stock of the
United States is of a very high standard. Often too, we have bleak
ly appraised industry’s slipping capacity to produce—all through
those mortgage lean years—offering our most inventive proposals
to rationalize and increase production; but in 1971, with money
available, conventional builders, seemingly at a moment’s notice,
produced 2,048,200 units, (1) the best year on record.
Still, we know that many, amidst this tremendous affluence,
are inadequately housed. But this stems from problems more
subtle and difficult than replacing slums or frantically boosting
production. It is perhaps more correctly described as the result
of inadequate economic institutions and fragile social relations;
that is, fundamental social and economic issues. Solutions effected
in these issues can improve our housing, but it is difficult for im
provements in our housing to effect solutions in these more basic
issues. Still, it is vital that the housing industry wrestle with its
side of the problem.
The thrust of this study is that the housing sector is integral
to the alleviation of these fundamental problems, but that it must
itself be healthy. The study will develop the case that lower cost
housing is neither encouraged nor possible within the context of
current housing practice, though there is a definite need. It indi
cates that much of this has developed from the erroneous belief
that higher priced housing would filter down to lower income users
through the natural function of the market but that, in fact, this
has largely failed and must fail as long as the housing market and
housing practices are structured as they a re. The study will indi
cate that lower cost housing is possible through a redefinition of
housing cost based on the life cycle costs of a unit rather than the
present first cost practice.
CURRENT NATIONAL HOUSING PRACTICE AND ITS COSTS
The role of the public sector in current housing practice is
two-fold: (1) facilitating the efficient operation of the private
sector, and (2) subsidizing certain elements within the housing
sector to correct for social inadequacies of the market. In prac
tice this has led to the many state, local and federal programs and
policies requirements and standards of which our housing stock is
almost a direct reflection.
Although the present structure of housing practice is controlled
and supported by government policy, it is not widely viewed as
such. These policies: codes, zoning, monetary policy, minimum
property standards, production subsidies, e tc., are often consid
ered individually as something apart from one another and other
aspects of housing as well. It is important not only to recognize
a particular policy, however, but the interdependence of all policies
and their total impact on the housing sector. Not only does this
attitude illuminate the complexities of the actual situation, but the
^Specialist, Building Systems and Research, McCue Boone
Tomsick, San Francisco, Calif.
285

inherent difficulties in effecting any major change as well. Some
elements of this control, such as FHA minimum standards, are
obvious; other factors, such as the influence of FHA and VA pol
icies on inflation of land prices are less so, but stiU evident. A
court decision supporting school desegregation through busing is
generally not considered at all, though its implications to housing
are potentially great.
There is some purpose for the existence of each of these pol
icies and each imposes restraints on the housing sector, which in
turn establishes in some part what housing wifi cost. There are
so many of these restrictions, all with some purpose, that they
have imposed a de facto price below which it is impossible to build
housing. In theory, we could remove some of the restrictions, but
which ones. All, to some degree, represent vested interests;
most exist for sound reasons and most contribute to our high gen
eral standard of housing. Codes are a very good example. From
the mid-sixties on, pressure mounted for building code reform .
Many felt it was the restrictive nature of outmoded codes that kept
us from producing true low cost housing. Code reform was under
taken, still continues and is an important step in the modernization
of the housing industry. But, sober reflection tells us that the
effect on first cost will be slight, for codes deal mainly with the
physical structure, which in turn is probably only a third of the
cost of the house. And, since it has not been the history of building
codes to lower any given standard, it must be assumed that standards,
hence costs, will gradually increase—even with code reform .
For the consumer, housing has a qualitative and quantitative
context. The qualitative aspects were made quite clear in the
report of the President’s Committee on Urban Housing (the Kaiser
Committee). Subsequent studies and Congressional action have
confirmed their work, and though we need not linger on the wellknown, it is valuable to reflect upon some of what that committee
found. In order to provide enough standard housing for the entire
population by 1978, the nation wiU need to build 13.4 million dwel
ling units for the new young families formed in the decade ahead,
and replace or rehabilitate 8.7 million units that are expected to
deteriorate into substandard condition, and replace 3 million units
that will be accidentally or intentionaUy destroyed, and build 1.6
million units to create the proper proportion of vacancies for an
increasingly mobile population. The total: a staggering 26.7
million units.
The problem is compounded, however, by the qualitative nature
of housing, especially for the 7.8 million house-poor fam ilies.
Unlike those in the normal housing market, they haven’t the dollars
to pay for their needs and preferences, which are both unique and
varied. They must have that possibility for their own satisfaction
and for the creation of an adequate and flexible housing stock.
Housing, along with food, clothing, transportation, and med
ical care, is a basic human requirement. It also has complex
personal, social, economic, and political implications, not the
least of which are connotations of property and symbolic standing
within the community. At its most basic level, housing must be
evaluated as to how adequately it shelters its inhabitants from
threats in their environments—from situations that are physically
or emotionally damaging. The house must serve as a refuge within
which the individual can refuel the energies and sense of security
that he needs to function in the outside world.
House-poor families generally range from the lower class
through traditional working class to lower middle cla ss; people
with different motivations and needs. In such a mix, expectations,
housing, and environment wiU vary widely. The lower middle
class, for example, is characterized by an increasing prosperity
that has given them an expanding outlook toward housing. There
is a great desire to own one’s home rather than enrich a landlord.
Along with the house and yard goes an elaboration of the house

interior in a manner that creates a pleasant and cozy image closely
approximating the standard of All-American affluence.
At the other extreme, for the lower class the primary criterion
for housing is that it provide shelter from physical and psychological
threats, both inside and outside the home. Lee Rainwater notes
that a “ home to which one could retreat from such an insecure
world would be of great value, but for lower class people such a
home is not easy to come by. In part, this is due to the fact that
one’s own family members themselves often make trouble or bring
it in the home, but even more important, it is because it seems
very difficult to create a home and an immediate environment that
actually does shut out danger. ” (2)
Woven through this spectrum of housing expectations are dif
ferent views of family size, child rearing practices, privacy, and
intangibles such as “ soul” and “ taste. ” Certainly housing is an
integral part of a family’s social and psychological well-being. It
is more than just something to keep out the elements. In contrast,
federal housing programs for those of low and moderate income
have generally assumed a middle class view which is applied so
that the results are only a shadow of anything that the middle class
would even look at.
It is apparent then that the societal context and implications of
housing are such that mere shelter is not acceptable. It is equally
apparent that current housing practice makes anything more than
mere shelter, no matter what the technology, impossible to pro
vide at a low first cost. However, this same society whose insti
tutions have made housing for the low income family impossible,
has also committed itself to compensating for those inadequacies
that is has created in the housing market. It would, therefore,
seem important to examine the housing costs in the larger context
of this society.
Where do the costs of housing accumulate over its life: what
are the actual costs, how are they paid and by whom. Figure 1
represents the average estimated cost for a $24,000.00 FHA fi
nanced home. It is limited to the costs directly attributable to the
unit itself with only peripheral indication of larger costs.

Finance and closing
Construction including profit & overhead
Land
Collected first cost
Monthly cost = $248.00 x 12 months =
$2976.00 x 45 ye a rs =
Furnishing and remodeling (45 years)
Total interest
Demolition
Total
Value of redeveloped property

$

2,592.00
18.368.00
4.270.00
25.230.00

Because filtering of housing is not proportional to the rate of
deterioration, there seems to be little hope of raising the rate of
depreciation above the rate of quality decline. Partial responsi
bility for this must be attributed to governmental and land planning
policies that have attempted to strengthen, not depreciate, values.
(3) However, even in an affluent society, the high initial cost of
housing and its role as a necessity naturally work against rapid
decline in values. Unfortunately, relative decline, when trans
lated into a price reduction, diminishes in the later stages of a
structure’s life. This occurs because, at each lower value level,
more families can afford to buy. Grigsby notes that, “ Assuming
the dwelling unit is not converted or demolished before the end of
its potential economic life, the entire depreciation curve is then
an inverted S, or the mirror image of a growth curve. ” (4) It
also appears that the families most satisfied with their accommo
dations, and thus most reluctant to move, tend to be those of higher
incomes on whom the market depends for creating most of the sur
plus supply that will filter down to families of lower earning power.
Considering the foregoing in light of the pyramidal shape of housing
values in which production near the top will be retarded by only a
small absolute excess of units, it is apparent that the farther down
the scale that new construction can be injected, the larger the
excess absolutely needed to check further building, and the greater
the ultimate effect at the bottom of the market.
That brings us back to producing a low cost house; something
apparently beyond our reach. We are faced with a socially in
equable situation. Society in some form must step in. In this
country the federal government, working directly or through del
egated agents, has assumed the major portion of this burden.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to say that this burden has been
assumed easily or in any systematic manner. But, there are
presently five major active federal subsidy programs aimed at
relieving these market inequities: Section 235 homeownership
housing, Section 236 rental housing, Rent supplements, Low rent
public housing, Rural homeownership housing. These programs
have been vigorously implemented over the past few years in par
ticular (see fig. 2).
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National Housing A ct). The figures fo r the
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upward since the first o f this year.
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It has been clear for some time that it is impossible to produce
an acceptable low cost house. Yet there has been a wide spread,
albeit diminishing belief, that the house-poor were served, if only
inefficiently, by the downward flow, or filtering of used housing
units.
Filtering is generally considered to be the result of shifts in
supply and demand, of excess vacancies, and the process by which
some sections of the housing stock become vacated, occupied by
lower income groups, abandoned, demonlished, or converted to
another use. We can compare filtering in the housing market to
the more obvious example of filtering in the case of automobiles.
A car is sold new and, despite the general inflation, it can gen
erally be purchased a decade later for a mere fraction of its orig
inal price, even if it is in the very best of condition. Many cars
will have, in that period, declined all the way to junk value and
passed out of the stock completely. A car will drop in value both
absolutely and relative to the auto stock as a whole and, in the
process, it becomes available to lower income groups. A house,
however, may not filter relative to the housing inventory in the
same direction as it filters relative to general prices. Housing
can filter up or down. Further, since the rate of deterioration of
a house is highly controllable and is much more a function of under
lying demand factors rather than of time or weather, filtering must
be associated with technological, site, and locational obsolescence
as well. Deterioration may simply be the manifestation of the later
factors.
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Subsidized production of low and moderate income housing
has increased to the point that it represented approximately onefourth of national production in 1971 (see fig. 3). HUD estimates
assisted starts increasing to 500, 800 in the current period and
564,000 in FY 197 3. (5)
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Good; this is what many of us have been wanting for some
time: a serious assault on the shortage of standard housing for
those households unable to afford what the market offers.
Unfortunately, our long sought assault has created a situation
that we had not envisioned. This situation gained general attention
from the special investigation of “ abuses in federal low-andmoderate income housing programs” , conducted by the House
Committee on Banking and Currency. Reading the case studies of
this report is a discouraging saga of “ faulty plumbing, leaky base
ments and roofs, cracked plaster, faulty or inadequate wiring,
rotten wood in floors, staircases, ceilings, porches, lack of in
sulation and faulty heating units. ” This is corroborated by recent
GAO findings that 25 percent of all newly built homes under the
235 homeownership program had serious structural defects that
should have been corrected before sale. The most serious abuses,
however, seem to be associated with existing and rehabilitated
houses. There, for example, the GAO found serious defects in 44
percent of existing homes bought under subsidy programs.
The cost and waste of such abuses outrage us because they are
highly visible. But less visible costs may be even greater. 235
and 236 are financed by budget gimmickry with mortgage interest
subsidies stretched over 30 and 40 years. This stretch-out made
initial expenditures very small, and attractive when they were
initiated. But what started as a token program in 1968 turns out
to have enormous consequences in 1972. We are now visibly
alarmed over runaway housing subsidy costs. In its goals report,
the Administration said that “ for the three fiscal years 1970 to
1972 (we) have already obligated the federal government to subsidy
payments of perhaps $30 billion over the next 30 to 40 years. . . By
1978 present estimates suggest that the federal government will be
paying out at least $7.5 billion in subsidies.. .Over the life of the
mortgages this could amount to the staggering total of more than
$200 billion. .. ” (6)
This disastrous situation has further complications. Many
are now claiming that F .H .A . is underwriting the collapse of large
residential areas of our central cities. “ The agency’s programs
designed to allow poor people to own their homes have been largely
misused by corrupt real estate speculators who are buying and
selling unsound houses in decaying urban neighborhoods to people
who cannot afford to refurbish, or even maintain them. ” (7) The
result: abandonment of single-family dwellings and the attraction
of drugs, crime and other social ills to what used to be stable ur
ban communities on a scale that is decimating entire neighborhoods.
The gravity of this problem is illustrated by the belief of many
housing experts that the Federal Government is the largest owner
of single-family dwellings in at least two major cities, Philadelphia
and Detroit. The cost of repossessing the housing is staggering,
$200 million in these two cities alone. In Detroit, HUD and GAO
experts estimate that the Federal Government has lost about
$10, 000 per house and would have to invest another $9,000 in each
house to make it more liveable, and still there probably wouldn’t
be any buyers.
LIFE CYCLE PERFORMANCE STANDARD
We need an entirely new housing policy, one based in a broad
perspective that recognizes housing as part of a larger eco-system
of social requirements and costs. This viewpoint necessitates a
life cycle definition of housing requirements and costs to the in
dividual and the larger society. For the unit itself this means an
accounting of: first cost, cost of money, cost of use-denial,
operation and maintenance, rehabilitation, conversion, demolition.
Housing induced costs to the larger society are more difficult but
include items in the categories of: public safety costs of deterio
rated houses and neighborhoods, use-denial costs of capital in
vested in housing, costs in fixed public utilities and facilities for
given development patterns, costs in discarded fixed public utilities
and facilities associated with abandoned homes and neighborhoods,
economic activity generated by replacement of obsolete or sub
standard dwellings. Additionally, there are many housing-related
factors such as general environmental quality which are not easily
given a dollar figure but still have deep economic implications.
With this comprehensive definition of life cycle building costs
it becomes possible to begin to develop a more realistic housing
287

policy. Such information would allow one further innovation: hous
ing policy developed to the level performance necessary to meet
stated national housing goals. Past housing policies, in contrast,
have relied too heavily on only hopes and expectations. Perfor
mance standards establish how the elements of a structure must
perform to meet certain requirements rather than prescribing an
acceptable response to a particular situation. This definition
would be retained in developing a new housing policy but it would
be interpreted more broadly.
HUD presently is completing a performance specification,
Guide Criteria for the Design and Evaluation of Operation Break
through, covering all dwelling types from single-family detached
to multi-family highrise. This excellent document is chiefly con
cerned with matters of health, safety and comfort. However, it
could be expanded to include standards of maintenance, operational
expense, longevity, permutability, disposability, e tc .; standards
that would apply to each element of life cycle housing costs. Such
a performance guide depends on more data than is presently avail
able and would be impossible to list here. Yet, it is valuable to
touch on the general nature of such a guide in order to illustrate
the complexity of interrelationships it should resolve.
Criteria concerned with the maintenance and operation of a
housing unit, permutability in relation to use or rehabilitation or
demolition are essentially technical problems. They would, there
fore, fit fairly comfortably into the format already established by
the HUD document. Policy questions, however, are not strictly
technical and are subject to complex interrelationships of market
and non-market factors. These form the difficult areas of any
comprehensive performance standard for housing.
A highly simplified look at housing stock replacement rates,
for example, reveals this complexity. Replacement rate require
ments are established by: 1) setting optimum economic life for
units of a given quality-type; 2) balancing this against the outright
loss of units to the housing stock for that quality-type; 3) all the
forementioned factors are then integrated with the rate of consumer
improvement demand. Consumer improvement demand is a pre
diction of what the demand for housing improvements will be over
a given time period, combined with what policymakers determine
will most benefit the overall housing stock during that same period.
Whether the housing stock should be replaced continuously over
that period, or totally at one time, have wide ramifications and
are questions that add further to the complexity of establishing
such standards. Related policies establishing elements such as
minimum space and quality standards are established in other
parts of the performance criteria, but must be reflected in the
replacement rate policy requirements. Finally such a guideline
to replacement rates must have the flexibility and fine control to
respond to local deviations from the National Standard.
All elements of the housing policy would be delineated by these
specific standards of performance, and though the effects on the
housing sector are not entirely clear, they would be many. It
seems likely, for example, that there would be an increased em
phasis on the modification of housing. This, in turn, would bring
change in other components of the housing sector. Financial in
stitutions might provide long term loans for re-modeling not gen
erally available at present. Tenure patterns might lengthen,
restricting the filtering that does exist. An entirely new industry
of standard replacement components might emerge.
In almost all areas of such a guideline, the voice of the con
sumer would be strengthened.
IMPLICATIONS
The contention here should be clear. There is a defacto limit,
below which it is impossible to build housing in this society. That
limit should be recognized, as should the fact that first costs are
only a small part of the economic activity associated with a housing
unit over its life. That in fact we should not limit our concern to
first costs but should seek to rationalize lifetime costs. Society
has committed itself to decent housing for all, including outright
subsidy where necessary. It should therefore recognize the nature
of its commitment, including the larger costs to itself and seek to
optimize the whole even though initial costs for individual units
might increase. Actually realizing this optimal condition depends

on a workable, comprehensive policy that subjects the various
components of the housing sector to uniform standards of perfor
mance .
Such a comprehensive standard implies the active role of the
Federal Government. But, there is a backlash growing against
federal involvement in housing. Fortune magazine, for example,
recently called for a return to reliance on the market with the
federal government confining itself to “ providing broad incentives
and refereeing conflicts between various groups of citizens. ” (8)
But falling back on the market simply says that the problem is
not within our grasp. We would lose a great foothold of valuable
though costly experience and allow the largest component of our
national investment to wander, thereby lessening our ability to
manage the nation’s economic well-being. And still our housing
problems would not disappear. Political pressure would inevitable
grow again for immediate solutions, the pendulum would swing,
and we would be back to a chaotic mixture of short-term cures.
For those of us involved in housing industrialization and sys
tems, these are critically important issues. Industrialization
depends on a predictable market; a comprehensive housing policy
provides this. Conversely, a workable housing policy depends on
uniform standards and predictable levels of performance from the
individual units within the housing stock—concepts at the very heart
of industrial production. Plainly, our housing problems cannot be
solved without a comprehensive housing policy, and this will be
difficult to implement without the long term commitment of true
industrialization, commitment that utilizes industrial capabilities
and resources to control planning, design, construction, operation,

maintenance, rehabilitation and final disposal of all units within
the housing stock. Long term commitment will not be feasible or
attractive until a method is devised to measure the social and
economic long-term value of housing. Long term evaluation re
quires performance criteria, both accurate and relevant, by which
to measure.
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